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CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
DUE PROCESS
ILANA FRIER∗
INTRODUCTION
College women experience rape and sexual assault at alarmingly
high rates.1 One highly publicized statistic, famously asserted by
President Obama,2 states that one in five women experience sexual
assault while attending college.3 In 2011, the U.S. Department of
Education radically expanded its involvement in campus sexual
misconduct adjudications, encouraging vigorous enforcement.
Sustained regulatory and public pressure effectuated some positive
change for victims.4 However, a proliferation of litigation also followed.
Students found responsible of campus sexual assault, most of whom
were males, increasingly began suing their schools alleging due process
violations in their adjudications.5 In 2018, the Trump administration’s
Department of Education proposed a new rule (the “Proposed Rule”),
in part to strengthen what it perceived as procedural deficiencies in the
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1. Campus Sexual Violence Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/cam pus-sexual-violence.
2. President Barack Obama & Vice President Joseph Biden, Remarks by the President and
Vice President at an Event for the Council on Women and Girls (Jan. 22, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/22/remarks-president-and-vicepresident-event-council-women-and-girls.
3. See, e.g., Christopher Krebs et al, Campus Sexual Assault Study, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5-3 (Dec. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf
(“Overall, 19% of undergraduate women reported experiencing attempted or completing sexual
assault since entering college.”); see also Christopher Krebs et al, Campus Climate Survey
Validation Study Final Technical Report, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., DEP’T OF JUSTICE 73 (Jan.
2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccsvsftr.pdf (“The prevalence rate for completed
sexual assault since entering college among the female sample . . . [was an] average rate of 21%.”).
4. Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://prospect.org/justice/sex-lies-justice/.
5. Greta Anderson, More Title IX Lawsuits by Accusers and Accused, INSIDE HIGHER
EDUC. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/03/students-look-federalcourts-challenge-title-ix-proceedings.
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regulatory landscape established by the previous administration.6 This
Note analyzes the extent to which the Proposed Rule brings the scales
back to equipoise by strengthening the due process rights for the
accused, and where the Proposed Rule falls short of sufficiently
supporting the victims. The Proposed Rule appropriately affords basic
due process rights that were either explicitly or implicitly lacking under
the old regime, but in some instances the Proposed Rule overreaches
at the expense of the victims.
I. BACKGROUND
The Department of Education (“DOE”) utilizes Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 to address student-on-student sexual
misconduct at recipient schools.7 Although Title IX is now inexorably
linked to campus sexual misconduct, Title IX and related DOE
regulations initially focused on ensuring that schools themselves did
not discriminate based on sex.8 Title IX “prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex in any federally funded education program or activity.”9
It authorizes DOE to promulgate rules and terminate federal funds of
recipient schools out of compliance with those rules.10 Under the first
regulations promulgated by DOE, which are still in force today,
recipient schools must: (1) adopt, publish, and distribute a policy stating
that the school does not discriminate based on sex,11 (2) designate at

6. Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule Provides Clarity for Schools, Support for
Survivors, and Due Process for All, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/
news/press-releases/secretary-devos-proposed-title-ix-rule-provides-clarity-schools-supportsurvivors-and-due-process-rights-all.
7. Throughout this Note, “recipient schools” or “schools” refers to postsecondary
educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance for educational programs or
activities from the U.S. Department of Education.
8. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2019) (describing the purpose of the regulations effectuating Title IX
as eliminating sex discrimination in educational programs); 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (2019) (requiring
schools develop grievance procedures to resolve complaints of sex discrimination by the schools
themselves); Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 898
(2016) (explaining that the current view of Title IX as addressing student-on-student sexual
misconduct “was alien at the time of enactment”).
9. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018).
10. See id. § 1682 (“Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of
general applicability . . . . Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected . . . by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such
program or activity to any recipient.”); see also Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. (Apr. 2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.
11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.9(a)–(c).
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least one employee to serve as a Title IX Coordinator,12 and (3) create
and publish grievance procedures “providing for prompt and equitable
resolution” of sex discrimination.13 The Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”)
within DOE enforces Title IX by investigating and resolving
complaints of sex discrimination and conducting institution-level
compliance reviews.14 The Supreme Court has also recognized a federal
private right of action for victims of sex discrimination by recipient
schools.15
After the promulgation of the 1975 regulations, the Supreme Court
clarified recipient schools’ obligations to address sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination. In 1992, the Court found that Title IX
applied to employee-on-student sexual harassment16 when the school
had “actual knowledge” of the harassment and responded with
“deliberate indifference.”17 In 1999, the Court extended these holdings
to student-on-student sexual harassment, holding that a school can be
liable if it “acts with deliberate indifference to the known acts of
harassment in its programs or activities” but “only for harassment that
is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars
the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”18 OCR
guidance in 1997 and 2001 began to address sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination, focusing on schools’ obligations to ensure
the schools themselves do not commit or perpetuate sex
discrimination.19 In 1997, OCR determined that schools create a

12. Id. § 106.8(a).
13. Id. § 106.8(b).
14. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.
15. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703, 717 (1979) (“We have no doubt that Congress
intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it
understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited
discrimination.”).
16. See Franklin v. Gwinnet Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (granting remedy to
student harmed by an employee’s sexual harassment).
17. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1992).
18. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 633, 633 (1999).
19. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,040 (Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter “1997
Guidance”] (“Thus, Title IX does not make a school responsible for the actions of harassing
students, but rather for its own discrimination in failing to remedy it once the school has notice.”);
see also Office for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 12 (Jan. 19, 2001),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [hereinafter “2001 Guidance”]
(notice of publication being located at 66 Fed. Reg. 5512) (“[A]s long as the school, upon notice
of the harassment, responds by taking prompt and effective action to end the harassment and
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“hostile environment” by failing to address sexual harassment.20 Once
remedied, schools sufficiently complied with Title IX.21 In 2001, OCR
clarified how to remedy such a hostile environment and established six
factors it would consider when investigating schools’ grievance
procedures to determine whether they comport with a “prompt and
equitable resolution” for incidents of sex discrimination.22
In 2011, OCR fundamentally shifted its enforcement of Title IX.23
OCR issued a “Dear Colleague Letter,” (“DCL”) establishing specific
procedural requirements that recipient schools must utilize to remedy
student-on-student sexual harassment.24 The DCL was later
supplemented by a 2014 guidance document.25 The DCL introduced
“sexual violence” as a type of harassment covered under Title IX,
mandated a preponderance of the evidence standard for sexual
misconduct adjudications, declined to require live hearings, and
expressed a strong disapproval of the use of cross-examination.26 While
the DCL facially provided claimants and respondents equal rights
throughout the process,27 it was widely perceived by judges and legal
commentators as promoting the rights of victims at the expense of the
accused.28 The DCL dedicated two sentences of the nineteen-page
prevent its recurrence, the school has carried out its responsibility under the Title IX
Regulations.”).
20. 1997 Guidance, supra note 19, at 12,039.
21. Id. at 12,039–40.
22. 2001 Guidance, supra note 19, at 20 (the notice of publication is located at 66 Fed. Reg.
5512) (“[1] Notice . . . of the procedure, including where complaints may be filed; [2] Application
of the procdure to complaints . . .; [3] Adequate, reliable, and impartial investigations of
complaints, including the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence; [4] Designated
and reasonably prompt timeframes for the major stages of the complaint process; [5] Notice to
the parties of the outcome of the complaint; and [6] An assurance that the school will take steps
to prevent recurrence of any harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the
complainant and others, if appropriate.”).
23. Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 901 (2016).
The authors suggest that through the DCL, OCR signaled to schools that their grievance
procedures would now be subject to governmental oversight, whereas previously OCR “simply”
monitored whether schools themselves were engaging in sex discrimination. Id. at 902.
24. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
to Colleague (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague201104.pdf [hereinafter “Dear Colleague Letter”].
25. Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 29,
2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
26. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 1, 10–12.
27. See id. at 11 (providing both parties with an equal opportunity to present relevant
witnesses and other evidence).
28. See, e.g., Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 779 (5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J.,
dissenting) (“[The OCR] procedures prescribed for adjudication of sexual misconduct are heavily
weighted in favor of finding guilt.”); see also Task Force on the Response of Universities and
Colleges to Allegations of Sexual Violence, White Paper on Campus Sexual Assault Investigations,
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guidance to the procedural protections schools should afford accused
students:
Public and state-supported schools must provide due process to the
alleged perpetrator. However, schools should ensure that steps
taken to accord due process rights to the alleged perpetrator do not
restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title IX protections of the
complainant.29

OCR vigorously enforced the DCL.30 It published and regularly
updated a list of schools under investigation;31 by 2018, OCR had 305
active investigations.32 Fearing financial repercussions,33 schools
“scrambled” to comply and “stave off or resolve OCR investigations.”34
Many schools modified their grievance procedures in ways that made
sexual misconduct cases easier to resolve. For example, some schools
removed protections previously afforded to accused students;35 others
lowered the burden to preponderance of the evidence for sexual
misconduct cases while retaining higher burdens for other types of
misconduct.36 When Harvard changed its policies in 2011, a group of

AM. C. OF TRIAL LAW. 19 (Mar. 2017), https://www.actl.com/docs/default-source/defaultdocument-library/position-statements-and-white-papers/task_force_allegations_of_sexual_
violence_white_paper_final.pdf (“Concerns of withdrawal of federal funding combined with
media attention surrounding campus sexual assault, may cause universities—consciously or not—
to err on the side of protecting or validating the complainant at the expense of the accused.”).
29. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12. This characterization is not entirely accurate,
see discussion infra Section III.
30. U.S. Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with Open
Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 1, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/
news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-highereducation-institutions-opentitle-i (“[Recipients that] violate the law and refuse the address the problems identified by OCR
can lose federal funding or be referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for further action.”).
31. Id.; Nick DeSantis, Education Dept. Stops Providing Details on Resolved Title IX Cases,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Education-DeptStops/242831//.
32. Title IX Tracker, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (last updated Mar. 15, 2018),
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/. The Chronicle of Higher Education aggregated data on
open and resolved OCR Title IX investigations up until March 15, 2018 when OCR announced it
would stop providing information on its Title IX cases. Id.
33. Doe v. Purdue, 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 2019); Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment
Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethinkharvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html.
34. Gersen & Suk, supra note 23, at 902.
35. See, e.g., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 578 (D. Mass. 2016) (noting that
from 2011–12 manual to the 2013–14 manual, the school made “significant revisions to the
process . . . with even fewer protections to the accused”); Doe v. Wash. and Lee Univ., No. 6: 14CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (noting that the school removed the
accused student’s right to counsel, among other changes).
36. See, e.g., Brandeis University, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 607 (lowering standard to preponderance
of the evidence for sexual misconduct and retained clear and convincing for other code
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Harvard Law professors denounced the new sexual misconduct policy
as “lack[ing] the most basic elements of fairness and due process” and
called the process “overwhelmingly stacked against the accused.”37
In the wake of this regulatory shift, a wave of male students found
responsible in sexual misconduct adjudications at the campus level
sued their schools with some success. These students alleged either or
both of gender discrimination under Title IX38 and due process
violations.39 Regardless of intent, OCR pitted the accused students’ due
process rights against those of the victims, putting schools in a “double
bind.”40 Schools either “c[a]me under public fire for not responding to
allegations of sexual assault aggressively enough or they open[ed]
themselves to Title IX simply by enforcing rules against perpetrators.”41
After the 2016 election and change in administration, DOE
withdrew the DCL42 and announced its intention to promulgate new
rules specifying schools’ Title IX obligations.43 In its Proposed Rule,
DOE established several “procedural safeguards” schools must
integrate into their grievance procedures.44 These included: impartial
decision makers, the accused’s right to written notice of the charges,
equal ability to access and present evidence and witnesses, the
requirement of a live hearing with cross-examination, and the option
for schools to utilize a clear and convincing standard of proof.45 As of
April 7, 2020, the comment period has closed and the Proposed Rule is

violations); Wash. and Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996 at *9 (lowering standard to preponderance of
the evidence for sexual misconduct rather and retained beyond a reasonable doubt for honor code
violations).
37. Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 14, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassmentpolicy/
HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html.
38. E.g., Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2016) (alleging gender
discrimination).
39. E.g., Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1217 (D. Or. 2016) (alleging both
gender discrimination and due process violations).
40. See id. at 1226.
41. Id. at 1226–27.
42. Letter from Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
to Colleague, (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix201709.pdf.
43. Secretary Betsy DeVos, Secretary DeVos Prepared Remarks on Title IX Enforcement
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-devos-prepared-remarks-title-ixenforcement.
44. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,474–75, 61,477 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
45. Id. at 61,471–72.
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being finalized.46 Unsurprisingly, the Proposed Rule was met with
resistance in the public debate, and many news outlets portrayed it as
an assault on women’s rights.47 However, a more nuanced discussion is
necessary as to the procedural protections afforded to accused
students.
II. DUE PROCESS
As state institutions, public colleges must comport with due process.
Although the Due Process Clause does not extend to actions by private
actors, students at private colleges may also have some due processesque rights. Students at private colleges may benefit from a judicially
formed right to basic fairness, and courts have referred to due process
principles when evaluating the fundamental fairness of college sexual
misconduct disciplinary procedures.48 Students may also have an
implied state contract law right to procedural protections that schools
voluntarily promise to provide its students in handbooks or other
materials.49
The Due Process right found in the Constitution protects against
the “depriv[ation] of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law,”50 and is applicable to the federal government and state
governments through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
respectively. To successfully state a due process claim, a student must
have a sufficient property or liberty interest upon which the school
infringed.51 Then, the reviewing court determines what process, if any,

46. Simone C. Chu & Iris M. Lewis, What Happens Next with Title IX: DeVos’s Proposed
Rule, Explained, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/
2/27/title-ix-explainer/; Nicole Gaudiano, New Title IX Rule Ready to Drop, POLITICO (Apr. 1,
2020), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-education/2020/04/01/new-title-ix-rule-read
y-to-drop-despite-pleas-for-delay-786557.
47. E.g., Jennifer Medina & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, ‘An Attack on Students’ Rights’
Reactions to Betsy DeVos’s New Rules on Sexual Assault, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/devos-college-sexual-assault.html; Dana Bolger &
Alexandra Brodsky, Betsy DeVos’s Title IX Interpretation is an Attack on Sexual Assault
Survivors, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/
wp/2017/09/08/betsy-devoss-title-ix-interpretation-is-an-attack-on-sexual-assault-survivors/.
48. See, e.g., Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 602 (D. Mass. 2016).
49. See, e.g., Doe v. Trs. Of Boston Coll., 892 F.3d. 67, 87 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposed under Massachusetts contract law applied in the
context of school disciplinary proceedings); see also Ebert v. Yeshiva Univ., 780 N.Y.S.2d 283, 286
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (noting that courts will review private university action as to whether the
school followed its own policies and acted in good faith).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XVIII.
51. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). In the context of campus sexual
assault cases, suspensions and expulsions can implicate a protected property interest. See, e.g.,

FRIER FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

124

4/12/2020 7:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 15

the Constitution requires using the three-part balancing test the
Supreme Court established in Matthews v. Eldridge.52 This test
balances: (1) the private interest of the accused student; (2) the interest
of the college, including “fiscal and administrative burdens;” and (3)
the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the accused student’s] interest
through the procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.”53 Due process “is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and
circumstances.”54 More serious deprivations of a protected interest
require more demanding process.55 At a minimum, the Supreme Court
has held that students in campus disciplinary proceedings are entitled
to “some kind of notice and some kind of hearing.”56 Due process does
not, however, entitle accused students to the full trial rights afforded to
criminal defendants.57 Fundamentally, due process requires that the
accused has a meaningful opportunity to be heard and defend him or
herself.58
In the context of college sexual misconduct cases, courts have
recognized that both students accused of sexual misconduct and
schools adjudicating such cases have compelling interests at stake.
Charges of sexual assault “carry the potential for substantial public
condemnation and disgrace”59 and they can affect long-term
educational and employment prospects.60 Moreover, students have an
interest in avoiding wrongful punishment and the consequential
stigma.61

Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2017) (suspension); Doe v. Northern Mich.
Univ., 393 F.Supp.3d 683, 693 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (quoting Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d. at 399)
(expulsion). Courts have found sufficient liberty interests rooted in reputational harm or the
liberty to pursue a certain career. See, e.g., Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 661–63 (7th Cir.
2019) (freedom to pursue a career in the Navy); Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d. at 399 (reputational
harm).
52. E.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 399 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334–35).
53. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
54. Id. (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 386 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
55. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (noting that expulsions and suspensions
longer than the 10-day suspension at issue in this case “may require more formal procedures.”)
56. Id. at 579.
57. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
58. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong
v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).
59. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 607 (D. Mass. 2016).
60. E.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2018); Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860
F.3d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 2017).
61. Haidak v. Univ. Of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2019).
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Schools have a strong interest in maintaining a safe educational
environment, protecting their campuses from those who violate the
schools’ codes of conduct or policies,62 and conserving finite
administrative resources.”63 Because Title IX ultimately serves to
eliminate sex discrimination in educational programs, the adjudication
of campus sexual misconduct under Title IX requires that recipient
schools consider the victims’ rights. Victims have a strong interest in
continuing their education while avoiding re-victimization.64 Growing
evidence illustrates the detrimental effects the adversarial system can
have on victims, especially cross-examination at live hearings.65 Victims’
advocates suggest that trauma-informed procedures—those that take
into account the effects of trauma from sexual offenses—can limit revictimization and protect victims’ mental and emotional well-being.66
III. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED RULE
Five overarching due process protections in the Proposed Rule will
be evaluated: (1) reduction of presumptions and biases; (2) notice of
the charges; (3) equal access and presentment rights with respect to
evidence; (4) live hearing with cross-examination; and (5) the burden
of proof. This section compares these five protections to the old
guidance under the DCL, assesses the degree to which the Proposed
Rule comports with due process, and proposes modifications to the
Proposed Rule when necessary to ensure sufficient protections for the
victims.

62. E.g., id.
63. E.g., Plummer, 860 F.3d at 774–75; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (“[F]urther
formalizing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the
teaching process.”).
64. See Cecilia Mengo & Beverly M. Black, Violence Victimization on a College Campus:
Impact on GPA and Student Dropout, 18(2) J. C. STUDENT RETENTION: RES., THEORY, & PRAC.
234, 242–43 (2015), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1521025115584750 (finding that
compared to college students who experience physical/verbal victimization, students who
experience sexual victimization drop out of school and see their GPAs drop more frequently);
Audrey Chu, I Dropped Out of College Because I Couldn’t Bear to See My Rapist on Campus,
VICE (Sept. 26, 2017), https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/qvjzpd/i-dropped-out-of-collegebecause-i-couldnt-bear-to-see-myrapist-on-campus.
65. Mary Fan, Adversarial Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C.
L. REV. 775, 775 (2014).
66. The Importance of Understanding Trauma-Informed Care and Self-Care for Victim
Service Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 30, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/archives/
ovw/blog/importance-understanding-trauma-informed-care-and-self-care-victim-serviceproviders.
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A. Presumptions and Biases
The Proposed Rule includes a number of requirements to reduce
biases. First, colleges must impose a presumption of non-responsibility
“until a determination regarding responsibility is made.”67 Second,
“credibility determinations may not be based on a person’s status as a
complainant, respondent, or witness.”68 A decision maker cannot “have
a conflict of interest or bias for or against complainants or respondents
generally or an individual complainant or respondent” and training
materials cannot “rely on sex stereotypes.”69 The DCL guidance
required that conflicts of interests be disclosed, with no discussion of
potential biases.70 Third, the Proposed Rule requires colleges to
separate the decision maker from the investigator.71 This eliminates the
“single-investigator model” implicitly permitted under the DCL
guidance.72 Under this model, one person serves as both the
investigator, who gathers evidence, and the decision maker, who
evaluates the evidence and renders a decision.73 Each of the factors
described above are addressed in turn.
1. Presumption of Non-Responsibility
While the DCL guidance facially required impartiality,74 in reality
schools “institutionaliz[ed] a presumption of guilt in sexual assault
cases.”75 For example, Stanford University’s training materials included

67. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,472 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 61,473 (“[D]ecision-maker [may] not have a conflict of interest or bias for or
against complainants or respondents generally or an individual complainant or respondent[.]”).
70. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12.
71. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61, 477
72. See Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note 25, at 11–12
(imposing no requirements on who conducts the investigation, and noting that the Title IX
Coordinator can serve as both the investigator and the decision maker, barring any conflicts of
interest).
73. ABA Criminal Justice Section Council, ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on
College Due Process Rights and Victim Protections: Recommendations for Colleges and
Universities in Resolving Allegations of Campus Sexual Misconduct, AM. BAR ASS’N 3 (June
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/2017/ABADue-Process-Task-Force-Recommendations-and-Report.authcheckdam.pdf.
74. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12 (“[P]rocesses cannot be equitable unless they
are impartial.”).
75. Peter Perkowaitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of Male Guilt, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Aug. 20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405311190359690457
6516232905230642.
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an excerpt from a book titled: “Why Did He Do That? Inside the Minds
of Angry and Controlling Men.”76 This resource instructed: “Everyone
should be very very cautious in accepting a man’s claim that he has
been wrongly accused.”77 Another document in Stanford’s training
materials on how to identify an abuser indicates that “[a]ct[ing]
persuasive and logical” is indicative of an abuser.78 An argument in
favor of the non-responsibility presumption rests on the de facto
presumption of guilt imposed by many schools under the DCL. In 2017,
a Federal Court of Appeals judge remarked that OCR “procedures
prescribed for adjudication of sexual misconduct are heavily weighted
in favor of finding guilt.”79
However, the presumption of non-responsibility is not required
under due process principles and may unfairly tilt the scales in the favor
of the accused. A presumption of non-responsibility should be viewed
as distinct from the presumption of innocence afforded to criminal
defendants.80 For one, criminal defendants retain this presumption until
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, a higher burden not applied
in campus disciplinary procedures.81 Campus sexual assault
adjudications will also never result in incarceration or loss of life.
Further, courts have routinely held that students in campus disciplinary
procedures are not entitled to the full trial rights enjoyed by criminal
defendants.82 In its public comment in response to the proposed rule,
the American Civil Liberties Union noted that the presumption of nonresponsibility is unnecessary because under either a preponderance of

76. Mike Armstrong, Op-Ed: A Thumb on the Scale of Justice, STAN. DAILY (Apr. 29, 2011),
https://www.stanforddaily.com/2011/04/29/op-ed-a-thumb-on-the-scale-of-justice/.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 779 (5th Cir. 2017) (Jones, J., dissenting).
80. See American Civil Liberties Union, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
“Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance” n. 71 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-comments-title-ixproposed-rule [hereinafter “ACLU Comment Letter”] (clarifying that the presumption of
responsibility does not appear in any other legal context and is not to be confused with the
presumption of innocence).
81. Democratic Attorneys General, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule “Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance”
35 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2019/01/2019-01-31Title-IX-Comments-Final.pdf [hereinafter “Attorneys General Comment Letter”].
82. E.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018) (personally confront accuser or
witnesses); Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio., 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (rules of criminal
procedure and open hearings); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir. 1987) (rules of
evidence); Henson v. Honor Committee of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983) (same);
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. Of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (“a full-dress judicial hearing”).
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the evidence or clear and convincing standard, the respondent prevails
if “the evidence is in equipoise.”83 Further, a presumption akin to a
presumption of innocence perpetuates rape myths, namely that women
often lie about sexual assault.84 A presumption of non-responsibility is
also itself a form of bias, and imposing this presumption seemingly cuts
against one of the primary purposes of the Proposed Rule—to
eliminate biases.85
2. Impartial Decision Makers
Due process requires an impartial adjudication process, which
inherently includes an unbiased decision maker.86 Furthermore, the due
process right of “some kind of hearing” afforded to students in campus
disciplinary procedures87 would be meaningless if the decision maker
“came to the hearing having predetermined [the accused’s] guilt.”88
The Proposed Rule generally strengthens the impartiality of the
decision maker by disallowing conflicts of interests and biases and
excluding the consideration of status as a victim or accused from
credibility determinations.89 An impartial tribunal is an essential
feature of due process,90 and the same holds true in the campus

83. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80.
84. See National Crime Victim Bar Association, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
“Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance” 11 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2018OCR-0064-102838 [hereinafter “NCVBA Comment Letter”].
85. See Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule Provides Clarity For All Schools, Support
for Survivors, and Due Process Rights for All, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Nov. 16, 2018) (stating
DOE’s goal with the proposed regulation was to ensure Title IX proceeding become more
“transparent, consistent and reliable” and ensuring Title IX “protects all students.”).
86. Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x. 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421
U.S. 35, 47 (1975)) (“It is unquestioned that a fundamental due-process requirement is an
impartial and unbiased adjudicator,”). See also Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 608
(D. Mass. 2016) (“[O]ne of the most basic components of fairness is an unbiased and neutral factfinder.”).
87. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1979).
88. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dietchweiler v. Lucas,
827 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2016)) (reversing the dismissal of a § 1983 due process claim on a
12(b)(6) motion and holding that the student adequately pled that he was deprived due process,
in part because two of the three members of the hearing panel rendered a decision without
reviewing the investigatory report, suggesting that they determined his guilt based solely on the
accusations and not the evidence).
89. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,462, 61,472.
90. E.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (“As this Court repeatedly has
recognized, due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or
quasi-judicial capacities.”).

FRIER FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DUE PROCESS

4/12/2020 7:35 PM

129

disciplinary context.91 The Proposed Rule makes clear that favoring or
disfavoring either party can generate liability for sex discrimination.92
Although the DCL purported to instill impartiality in decision
makers,93 these explicit requirements are necessary in light of the
reality of the DCL’s effect. The financial pressure exerted by OCR and
negative media attention have contributed to due process violations.
For example, the District of Colorado found it plausible that a Title IX
coordinator and an investigator were biased because they were “under
scrutiny due to [an] OCR investigation and related public pressure,”
which in turn contributed to a plausible due process violation.94
Another federal court found a plausible due process claim rooted in
impartiality in part because, at the hearing, the Title IX coordinator and
lead investigator gave “the appearance of support for [the
complainant].”95
Moreover, male students lacking viable due process claims have
successfully pleaded claims of gender bias under Title IX. Courts have
found sufficient allegations of gender bias based on sex stereotypes and
generalizations,96 efforts to quell public criticism, and attempts to shield
from financial repercussions by OCR.97 For example in Doe v.
Columbia University, the Second Circuit found that a plaintiff
sufficiently alleged that his decision makers “were all motivated . . . by
pro-female, anti-male bias,” at least partially to refute mounting
campus and public criticism “that Columbia was turning a blind eye to
female students’ charge of sexual assaults by male students.”98 With
respect to financial pressures, the Seventh Circuit noted that OCR
opening two investigations into a school rendered “the pressure on the
university to demonstrate compliance . . . far from abstract.”99 Similarly,
91. E.g., Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 601 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding students entitled to
presumption of impartiality in disciplinary action); Park v. Temple Univ., 757 F. App’x. 102, 106
(3d Cir. 2018).
92. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,473.
93. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 12 (highlighting procedural flaws and
shortcoming in OCR policy).
94. Norris v. Univ. of Colorado, Boulder, 362 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1007, 1021 (D. Colo. 2019).
95. Gischel v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 302 F. Supp. 3d 961, 978–79 (S.D. Ohio 2018).
96. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 608 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding “reason to
believe the Special Examiner decided [a male student’s] guilt to a substantial degree on unfair
generalizations, stereotypes, or logical fallacies”).
97. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2016).
98. Id. at 57.
99. See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019). The court went on to note
that evidence of various institutional pressures and the DCL in and of itself does not “get [a
plaintiff] over the plausibility line.” Id. at 669.

FRIER FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

130

4/12/2020 7:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 15

the First100 and Sixth101 Circuits have suggested that financial pressures
exerted by OCR could support a plausible inference of gender bias, if
sufficiently pleaded.
3. Single-Investigator Model
The single-investigator model is appropriately eliminated under the
Proposed Rule.102 Under this model, used by many schools under the
DCL guidance, the person that gathers the evidence also makes factual
findings about that evidence. One court described the single
investigator as “simultaneously the investigator, the prosecutor, and
the judge who determines guilt.”103 Although several federal circuit
courts have found that a decision maker assuming multiple roles in the
adjudicatory process is not a per se violation of due process, it can give
rise to a due process violation based in part on an impartial tribunal.104
Courts and legal professionals have denounced this model as
inherently susceptible to biases.105 Regardless of good intentions, any
individual can have implicit biases, make mistakes, or reach premature
conclusions.106 Having a neutral party evaluate the evidence and reach
a determination reduces the risk of erroneous outcomes.107

100. See Doe v. Tr. of Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 92–93 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding an allegation of
gender bias motivated by the DCL meritless because the plaintiff did not plead facts explaining
how it affected his specific adjudication).
101. Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586
(6th Cir. 2018).
102. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,477 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
103. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 579 (D. Mass. 2016). But cf. Purdue Univ.,
928 F.3d at 664 (noting that the single-investigator model does not necessarily render the process
unfair, but rather a plaintiff must rebut a presumption of impartiality and show prejudice by the
single-investigator).
104. E.g., Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 567 (6th Cir. 2011).
105. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 606 (noting that the dangers of combining these
functions in one person are “obvious”); ABA Criminal Justice Section Council, ABA Criminal
Justice Section Task Force on College Due Process Rights and Victim Protections:
Recommendations for Colleges and Universities in Resolving Allegations of Campus Sexual
Misconduct, AM. BAR ASS’N 3 (June 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/criminaljustice/2017/ABA-Due-Process-Task-Force-Recommendations-andReport.authcheckdam.pdf (reporting that this model “carries inherent structural fairness risks”).
106. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 606.
107. Id.

FRIER FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DUE PROCESS

4/12/2020 7:35 PM

131

B. Notice
The DCL guidance contained no explicit requirement that students
accused of sexual misconduct be notified of the charges against them.108
The Proposed Rule requires notice of (1) the alleged violations of the
college’s code of conduct and (2) sufficient details regarding the
allegations, including the identities of the parties involved, the date,
time, and location of the alleged incident.109 The Proposed Rule also
requires schools to inform accused students of their right to request and
inspect evidence.110 Further, it imposes on schools a continuing duty to
supplement the initial notice with additional allegations the school
later decides to investigate.111
Although courts vary in their formulation of what notice is due in
student misconduct proceedings, it is generally agreed that notice
should sufficiently ensure the accused student a meaningful
opportunity to be heard.112 For notice to be meaningful, it must include
some factual basis of the allegations.113 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, the degree of formality required corresponds to the
seriousness of the deprivation.114 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has
held that when students face expulsion, notice “should contain a
statement of the specific charges and grounds which, if proven, would
justify expulsion.”115
Both the initial notice requirement and the duty to supplement are
necessary due process protections. Under Matthews balancing, the
burden on the school to notify the accused of the charges when the

108. See generally Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24 (excluding any requirement of notice
to the alleged perpetrator); Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note
25 (same).
109. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,474 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.2d 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)
(“Notice satisfies due process if the student ‘had sufficient notice of the charges against him and
a meaningful opportunity to prepare for the hearing.’”); see also Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.3d
655, 661 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[Notice must be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections.”).
113. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
114. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (“[W]e have addressed ourselves solely to
the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder
of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.”).
115. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d. 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) (emphasis added).
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school has that information is low.116 Further, the risk of erroneous
outcome is high when one party—the school—has complete
information, while the other party—the accused—lacks even the basic
facts surrounding an investigation.117 In Doe v. Brandeis University,
Brandeis failed to give notice to the student accused of sexual assault
of the factual basis for the charge, despite his repeated requests.118 The
school only gave him what the court described as a “vaguely worded
[two-sentence] allegation.”119 Through the course of the investigation,
he was “forced to speculate.”120 Crucially, the decision maker found the
victim to be more credible.121 The court found that lack of notice
adversely affected the accused’s ability to respond to the allegations.122
The accused’s inconsistent recollection of events, according to the
court, “is exactly what one would expect where one party is fully
informed . . . and the other party remains ignorant.”123
The duty to supplement is similarly necessary because it violates
due process for a student to be punished for offenses of which he was
unaware. Without notice of the charge, the student cannot mount a
meaningful defense.124 For example, the Eastern District of Virginia
found a due process violation where an accused student was given
notice of only one incident on one specific date, but was expelled in
part based on incidents occurring on different dates.125 At the hearing,
the accused lacked notice of the charges against him and this
insufficient notice was inexorably tied to the adequacy of his
opportunity to be heard.126 It is further unfair for an accused student to
be punished for an offense of which he is unaware, based on testimony
given or evidence presented to defend against a different offense.127
116. See Doe v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 618 (E.D.
Va. 2016) (noting that the school only notified the student of an incident occurring on one date
but had knowledge of and expelled him based on different incidents that occurring on different
dates).
117. See Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 603 (D. Mass. 2016) (noting how the
respondent was unable to mount a defense).
118. Id. at 583.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 583, 603.
121. Id. at 603.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Doe v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 618
(E.D. Va. 2016).
125. Id. at 616–18.
126. Id. at 616–17.
127. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 242 (Cal. App. 2016) (noting
that “a disciplinary penalty based on testimony given while defending against a different charge

FRIER FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DUE PROCESS

4/12/2020 7:35 PM

133

From the victim’s perspective, however, the more detailed the
notice, the greater the potential confidentiality concerns and risk of
retaliation. A group of Attorneys General have suggested that
requiring disclosure of the complainant’s name and detailed factual
allegations could result in leaks or be sent to third parties, and
complainants might want to withhold their name or other confidential
information.128 However, to prepare a meaningful response, students
facing disciplinary sanctions must know the name of the
complainant.129 The 2001 OCR guidance recognized this. It instructed
that if a complainant requested his or her name be withheld, the
accused student’s response to the charges would be limited, and “OCR
would not expect a disciplinary action against” the accused, but the
school’s response could include supportive measures for the
complainant.130 The Proposed Rule should include a confidentiality
carve-out allowing complainants to withhold their name, provided that
the accused student is not subject to disciplinary measures as a result.
This enables the complainant to seek supportive measures, such as
rescheduling classes or new living arrangements, while ensuring the
scope of potential penalties respondents face is proportional. The
Proposed Rule should also do more to address retaliation concerns.131
For example, the notice should specifically apprise both parties that
retaliating against someone for complaining of sex discrimination is
itself a form of sex discrimination, and barred under Title IX.132 These

smacks of unfairness” when a student being investigated for one charge was disciplined in part
based on statements he gave related to another charge of which he was unaware); cf. In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (“These [attorney disbarment proceedings] are adversary proceedings of
a quasi-criminal nature. The charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They
become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of testimony
of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier statements and start
afresh.”).
128. Attorneys General Comment Letter, supra note 81, at 38–39.
129. See Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a
student facing disciplinary measures should be given the name of the witnesses testifying against
him and a report on the facts to which they will testify).
130. 2001 Guidance, supra note 22, at 17.
131. See ABA Criminal Justice Section Council, ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on
College Due Process Rights and Victim Protections: Recommendations for Colleges and
Universities in Resolving Allegations of Campus Sexual Misconduct, AM. BAR ASS’N 2 (June
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/2017/ABADue-Process-Task-Force-Recommendations-and-Report.authcheckdam.pdf
(recommending
that the Proposed Rule include provisions to prevent retaliation and to require communication
of such provisions to the parties during the investigatory and adjudicatory processes).
132. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2005); see generally Letter
from Seth M. Galanter, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights to Colleagues (Apr. 24, 2013),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201304.html#ftn3.
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modifications are necessary to protect victims from invasions of privacy
and retaliation.
C. Accessing and Presenting Evidence
The Proposed Rule requires that parties have equal access to and
opportunities to present evidence and witnesses.133 While the DCL
facially required equal rights in this respect,134 it implicitly encouraged
schools to treat complainants more favorably.135 For example, after a
respondent denied the allegations brought against him, Purdue
University withheld all the evidence it used to adjudicate his case.136 In
a similar case, The University of Southern California refused to provide
a respondent with the evidence the school had supporting the
allegations unless the respondent “actively sought it through a written
request.”137 In both cases, the respective courts found due process
violations.138 The Proposed Rule appropriately specifies universities’
obligations with respect to gathering and presenting evidence.
The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause “at least”
requires that respondents in campus misconduct adjudications receive
“an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story.”139 Some courts have gone
further. For example, the Fifth and Fourth Circuits support the
following minimum procedures schools must afford students in
disciplinary hearings: access to the names of witnesses and some
information on the facts to which they will testify, the opportunity to
133. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,498 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (“Provide equal opportunity for the parties to present witnesses and other
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence . . . . Provide both parties an equal opportunity to inspect
and review any evidence obtained as part of the investigation that is directly related to the
allegations raised in a formal complaint, including the evidence upon which the recipient does not
intend to rely in reaching a determination regarding responsibility, so that each party can
meaningfully respond to the evidence prior to conclusion of the investigation . . . . Create an
investigative report [and] . . . provide a copy of the report to the parties for their review and
written response . . . .”).
134. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 11(emphasis added) (“[P]arties must have
an equal opportunity to present relevant witnesses and other evidence.”).
135. Elizabeth Bartholet, et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title IX, HARV. UNIV. DASH
REPOSITORY 2 (Aug. 21, 2017), https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/Fairness
%20for%20All%20Students.pdf (“Though OCR did not require schools to treat accused students
unfairly in the investigation and adjudication process, its tactics put pressure on them to stack the
system so as to favor the alleged victims.”).
136. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 663 (7th Cir. 2019).
137. Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 248 (Cal. App. 2016).
138. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 663; Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th at 246.
139. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
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defend the charges either orally or through written affidavits of
witnesses, and access to a report of the decision maker’s findings.140 The
Seventh Circuit has held that “withholding the evidence on which [the
school] relied in adjudicating . . . guilt [is] itself sufficient to render the
process fundamentally unfair.”141
Under the DCL guidance, schools also treated complainants and
respondents dissimilarly with respect to which witnesses they
interviewed, what evidence they investigated, and what materials they
provided to the parties. Brandeis University, for example, refused to
provide the respondent with a copy of the investigatory report on which
he was found responsible until after both his adjudication and appeal
ended.142 Columbia University refused to interview any of the
witnesses the respondent identified, while interviewing at least one of
complainant’s witnesses.143 The University of Southern California gave
only the complainant copies of the investigatory notes taken on each
witness.144 These examples are inconsistent with due process. Failure to
investigate impeachment evidence when it is brought to the school’s
attention can be “fundamentally unfair” to the party raising that
evidence.145 Sexual assault cases often hinge on credibility, and thus
impeachment evidence may be particularly important with respect to
due process.146 Moreover, the Second Circuit found that declining to
interview witnesses the respondent identified as having favorable
information contributed to a plausible allegation of gender bias under
Title IX.147
The Proposed Rule also broadens the scope of the investigatory
evidence parties can obtain. This change is generally positive but lacks
necessary carve-outs. The Proposed Rule enables both parties to access
evidence obtained during the investigation that “is directly related to
the allegations raised in the formal complaint”148 as opposed to

140. Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961); see also Henson v.
Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 74 (4th Cir. 1983) (supporting the application of the
“minimum due process requirements for disciplinary hearings” as summarized by Dixon).
141. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 663.
142. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 585 (D. Mass. 2016).
143. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 n.10 (2d Cir. 2016).
144. Doe v. Univ. of So. Cal., 246 Cal. App. 4th 221, 244 (Cal. App. 2016).
145. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 664.
146. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
147. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 56.
148. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,475 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
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“information that will be used at the hearing[,]” which the DCL
required.149 Some have argued that the broader language in the
Proposed Rule invites parties to seek irrelevant or confidential
information. However, limiting disclosure to information used at the
hearing is problematic because relevance has been used to exclude
evidence potentially favorable to the accused, including impeachment
evidence. Schools have used lack of relevance to avoid investigating
impeachment or otherwise favorable evidence proposed by the
respondent. For example, Columbia University declined to interview
the respondent’s witnesses because the decision maker claimed it was
irrelevant.150 Similarly, Washington and Lee University declined to
interview some of the respondent’s witnesses, claiming that they
already had the facts they needed.151 Including a broad exception for
irrelevance could enable schools to selectively investigate under the
guise of relevance or lack of necessity. However, the Proposed Rule
should allow for redaction of sensitive information, such as medical
information, and should protect information covered under privileges
such as attorney-client and physician-patient.152 These exceptions
would protect complainants’ conversations with medical professionals,
and reduce the risk of unnecessary disclosure of sensitive information.
D. Cross-Examination at a Live Hearing
The Proposed Rule requires cross-examination at a live hearing.153
Instead of traditional cross-examination, the Proposed Rule should
utilize a third-party questioner model of cross-examination. This model
can achive the primary benefit of cross-examination—assessing
credibility—in a manner that is less adversarial and better suited to the
educational context in which the adjudications take place. Further,
carve-outs are necessary for specific situations in which any form of
cross-examination would have little probative value.
The requirement of cross-examination represents a sharp departure
from the DCL, and is one of the most contentious aspects of the
Proposed Rule.154 The Proposed Rule also bars questions about the
149. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 11.
150. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at n.10.
151. Doe v. Wash. and Lee Univ., No. 6: 14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996, at *4 (Aug. 5, 2015).
152. See ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80, at 30; Attorneys General Comment Letter,
supra note 81, at 42–43.
153. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,474.
154. E.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Keep Cross-Examination Out Of College Sexual-Assault
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complainant’s sexual history unless the evidence is offered to prove
someone other than the respondent committed the offense or to prove
consent,155 otherwise known as a “rape shield.”156 Either party can
request that the cross-examination occur with the parties in separate
rooms using live-stream technology to allow the decision maker to view
the testimony in real-time.157 The Proposed Rule also prohibits
respondents from conducting cross-examination themselves; rather, the
respondent’s advisor or a school-appointed advisor must do so.158 The
DCL did not require live hearings and strongly discouraged crossexamination.159
The Supreme Court has never ruled on what due process requires
with respect to cross-examination in post-secondary disciplinary
procedures. In other contexts, it has declared that “cross-examination
has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain truth,”160
and crucially allows for the assessment of demeanor and credibility.161
Circuit courts have noted that cross-examination is “most critical when
the issue is the credibility of the accuser.”162 Credibility disputes are
paradigmatic of sexual misconduct cases. Most student-on-student
sexual misconduct issues amount to a he-said-she-said dispute: the
parties assert competing claims supported by little, if any, corroborating
evidence, and the decision maker must determine which account is
more credible.163 Some courts have thus held that in campus sexual
misconduct cases where credibility is at issue, due process requires a
hearing with cross-examination.164 Further, the Sixth Circuit deemed

Cases, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Keep-CrossExamination-Out-of/245448.
155. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,475.
156. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule
Provides Clarity for Schools, Support for Survivors, and Due Process Rights for All (Nov.
16,
2018),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-proposed-title-ix-rule
provides-clarity-schools-support-survivors-and-due-process-rights-all.
157. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,475.
158. Id. at 61,474–75.
159. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 11–12.
160. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981).
161. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
162. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 401 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe v. Brandeis
177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 605 (D. Mass. 2016)).
163. ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80, at 25.
164. Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d. 56, 69 (1st Cir. 2019); Doe v. Baum, 903
F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).
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live questioning necessary and written statements insufficient because
adversarial questioning is essential to assessing credibility.165
Although cross-examination renders hearing outcomes more
reliable,166 administering traditional cross-examination in all sexual
misconduct adjudications imposes potentially massive administrative
and financial burdens on universities, and also risks re-traumatizing
complainants. Schools simply lack the resources to appropriately
administer the type of cross-examination envisioned by the Proposed
Rule. No matter how well-intentioned, the staff typically overseeing
disciplinary hearings are not judges or mediators and generally lack
legal training.167 The costs of retaining appropriate staff or training
existing staff could be prohibitive,168 especially since the Proposed Rule
requires schools to appoint advisors for students upon request.169 The
American Council on Education has argued that “highly legalistic,
court-like processes” are at odds with school’s core “educational
missions.”170 Schools also have a strong interest in encouraging students
to report sexual misconduct and avoid the infliction of additional,
unnecessary harm to those that come forward.171 Mandatory crossexamination could frustrate those interests. Undergoing crossexamination by an advisor of the respondent’s choice potentially
subjects the complainant to traumatization and other negative effects
linked to cross-examination.172 The prospect of being cross-examined
at a live hearing might also discourage students, both complainants and
witnesses, from participating.173 Also, the decision maker is barred from

165. Baum, 903 F.3d at 582–83.
166. E.g., Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d at 402.
167. International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, Comment
Letter on Proposed Rule “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” 8 (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.iaclea.org/
assets/uploads/pdfs/Title_IX_IACLEA_Response_Comments.pdf.
168. Id.
169. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,462, 61,474–75 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
170. American Council on Education, on Proposed Rule “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance” 8 (Jan. 20,
2019), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-to-Education-Department-on-ProposedRule-Amending-Title-IX-Regulations.pdf.
171. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 583 (6th Cir. 2018).
172. See NCVBA Comment Letter, supra note 84, at 12–13 (noting that the respondent’s
advisor of choice will often be an attorney who “is prepared to grill the survivor about the
traumatic details of the assault, or possibly an angry parent or a close friend” and the “adversarial
and contentious nature of cross-examination risks further unnecessary trauma . . . .”).
173. E.g., id. at 13.
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considering any out-of-hearing statements made by parties or
witnesses who refuse to submit to cross-examination.174 Thus, if parties
do not submit to cross-examination, critical evidence might be barred
from consideration.
However, a balance can be struck to achieve the primary benefit of
assessing credibility within the administrative capabilities of most
schools while also reducing the risk of further harm to victims. Many
schools have adopted, and courts have upheld as constitutionally
sound, a process by which a third-party questioner facilitates an
adversarial exchange using questions submitted by both parties.175 A
hearing panel or decision maker ultimately decides which questions to
ask and poses the questions. The parties can be located in different
rooms, and the third-party poses questions each side proposed to ask
the other, allowing the decision maker to assess the demeanor and
truthfulness of responses. Through the “iterative process” of
questioning, the complainant is informed by the answers given by the
respondent in real time, and vice versa.176 In upholding a similar
process, the First Circuit noted that traditional cross-examination
would not “increase the probative value of hearings or decrease the
risk of erroneous deprivation of due process.”177 The Seventh Circuit
upheld a version of this approach even where the parties were barred
from submitting follow-up questions.178 Many schools currently utilize
a version of this method,179 and a group of Democratic Attorneys
General supports its implementation.180
Moreover, irrespective of the format, live cross-examination may
not be necessary in all sexual misconduct cases. Although most cases
turn on testimonial evidence, not all do. For example, where video and

174. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. at 61,475.
175. E.g., Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/assessing-betsy-devosproposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault.
176. Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 70 (1st Cir. 2019) (upholding the
constitutionality of having a neutral board pose questions submitted by both sides, alternating
between the two sides, and examining each side three times, because the hearing was “reasonably
calculated to get at the truth” and “reasonably calculated to expose any relevant flaws” in the
complainant’s account).
177. Id. (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (quotation marks omitted).
178. Doe v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x. 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2016).
179. E.g., Assessing Betsy DeVos’s Proposed Rules on Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/assessing-betsy-devosproposed-rules-on-title-ix-and-sexual-assault (noting that Harvard uses a version of this method).
180. Attorneys General Comment Letter, supra note 81, at 41.
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photo evidence of the alleged sexual assault served as the primary
evidence and the complainant’s credibility was not at issue, the Fifth
Circuit found that limiting cross-examination to written questions did
not violate the accused’s due process.181 Further, when a respondent
admits to the allegations, cross-examination may be wholly
unnecessary: a confession eliminates the need to evaluate the
demeanor or memory of the complainant or witness.182 Live crossexamination in these two circumstances would have little to no
probative value and impose undue burdens on schools and
complainants. The Supreme Court has described the application of due
process as an “intensely practical matter” and has also noted that “[the]
very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”183 As such, the
Proposed Rule should exempt from live cross-examination cases
involving confessions and video evidence, or at least provide a
mechanism by which parties can petition the decision maker for
exemptions based on the circumstances.
E. Burden of Proof
The burden of proof required for sexual misconduct adjudications
represents another controversial change. The DCL prescribed the
preponderance of the evidence standard,184 while the Proposed Rule
allows schools to choose between preponderance of the evidence or the
higher standard of clear and convincing.185 If schools choose
preponderance of the evidence for sexual-related violations, they must
uniformly apply that standard to non-sexual violations carrying the
same maximum sanction.186 Ultimately, the higher burden of proof is
unnecessary if schools comply with the other procedural protections in
the Proposed Rule.

181. Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 775–76 (5th Cir. 2017).
182. See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plaintiff
who admitted to a felony drug offense was not denied due process when his school disallowed
him from cross-examining his arresting officer during his disciplinary hearing, and subsequently
expelled him).
183. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961)) (second alteration in original).
184. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 24, at 10–11.
185. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,477 (proposed Nov. 29, 2018) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
186. Id.
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Proponents of preponderance of the evidence lean on the nature of
Title IX. For one, Title IX is a civil rights statute and preponderance of
the evidence is used in civil rights litigation, including other suits under
Title IX.187 This standard is more consistent with the “equitable”
procedures required under current DOE regulations implementing
Title IX.188 OCR itself uses preponderance of the evidence when it
resolves issues of discrimination under Title IX.189 It also makes logical
sense to treat parties equitably “where there is no ex ante reason to
favor one side over the other.”190 These adjudications are also not
criminal proceedings and students never face incarceration, which also
supports the lack of necessity for a heightened standard.
Conversely, proponents of the clear and convincing standard focus
on the nature of the proceedings at issue. The Supreme Court has held
that the preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate in a
“typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private
parties;” whereas, clear and convincing can be used in civil cases
involving “allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal
wrongdoing by the defendant” where the interests at stake are more
substantial than money.191 The Court has further recognized that clear
and convincing may be especially beneficial when someone’s
reputation is at stake, and it has used this higher standard “to protect
particularly important individual interests in various civil cases.”192
Moreover, parties in civil rights litigation are afforded a vast array of
procedural protections not available to respondents in campus
misconduct proceedings, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and live hearings over which a judge presides.193
Respondents in sexual misconduct adjudications have a compelling
interest in safeguarding their reputation, especially in light of the
collateral consequences that accompany a finding of responsibility. The
Supreme Court has noted that due process is implicated when “a
person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” is in question.194
Disclosure of sexual misconduct could foreclose further educational or

187. See ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80, at 22.
188. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (2018).
189. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CASE PROCESSING MANUAL, ART. III, § 303 (effective Nov. 19,
2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcpm.pdf.
190. See ACLU Comment Letter, supra note 80, at 21.
191. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
192. Id.
193. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
194. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
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employment opportunities.195 For example, the respondent in Doe v.
Brandeis had a permanent notation of “serious sexual transgressions”
on his educational record.196 Reputational injuries in campus sexual
misconduct cases are comparable to those that follow a criminal
conviction for similar conduct, and the stigma associated with sex
offenses could be unduly harsh for someone who was never criminally
convicted.197 A finding of responsibility can be life-altering.
Schools also have a strong interest in maintaining safe and
productive learning environments, which includes supporting victims
and ensuring all students perceive the process as fair. A higher standard
of proof, especially coupled with the presumption of non-responsibility,
could be interpreted as swinging the pendulum in the opposite
direction of the DCL suggesting favoritism toward the accused.
Avoiding even the appearance of bias is in the school’s best interest.
Further, allowing schools to use the “clear and convincing” standard for
sexual misconduct and the preponderance of the evidence standard for
other types of misconduct suggests that complainants in sexual
misconduct should be viewed with enhanced scrutiny. This may
perpetuate harmful stereotypes about rape and sexual assault victims,
namely that they should not be trusted.198 In fact, research suggests that
false accusations are rare.199
Ultimately, respondents have a particularly compelling private
interest, but the probative value of the higher standard is likely
minimal, given the other procedural protections in place under the
Proposed Rule. Courts have been particularly critical of schools’
utilization of preponderance of the evidence when other key
procedural protections were lacking. For example, the court in Brandeis
University noted that the lower standard was concerning in light of the
school’s deliberate elimination of other procedural protections.200
Former federal judge Nancy Gertner has also described Harvard’s
regime as “the worst of both worlds, the lowest standard of proof,

195. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975); Doe v. Brandeis, 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 601–
02 (D. Mass. 2016).
196. Brandeis, 177 F. Supp. at 571.
197. Id. at 601–02.
198. NCVBA Comment Letter, supra note 84, at 14–15.
199. David Listak et. al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of
Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1318 (2010), https://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/10.1177/1077801210387747 (finding a prevalence rate of false accusations of sexual assault to
be between two and ten percent).
s 200. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d at 607.
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coupled with the least protective procedures.”201 Preponderance of the
evidence should suffice, provided that schools comply with other
previously-discussed aspects of the Proposed Rule.
CONCLUSION
The procedural protections afforded by the Proposed Rule are well
calculated to reduce the erroneous findings of responsibility
perpetuated by the DCL. Basic due process rights must be afforded
before punishment is imposed, and courts are increasingly finding
sufficiently pleaded allegations of due process violations in campus
sexual assault adjudications. Ultimately, an equitable process benefits
both the respondents and the complainants, who have an interest not
only in avoiding challenges to their own adjudications but also in the
public perception of campus sexual assault and its victims. As Judge
Nancy Gertner has stated, “[i]t takes only a few celebrated false
accusations of rape to turn the clock back.”202

201. Nancy Gertner, Sex, Lies and Justice, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 12, 2015), https://prospect
.org/justice/sex-lies-justice/.
202. Id.

